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PREVIEW; Keefe v. Kirkegard: Constitutional Implications of
Sentencing a Juvenile to Life Imprisonment Without the
Possibility of Parole
Shelby Towe*
The Montana Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral
arguments in the matter of Keefe v. Kirkegard on September 11,
2020, at 9:30 a.m. via Zoom. John R. Mills will likely appear on
behalf of Appellant Steven Wayne Keefe, and Timothy C. Fox will
likely appear on behalf of Appellee the State of Montana.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case comes to the Montana Supreme Court more than
thirty-three years after a triple homicide conviction. The issues
presented are: (1) whether Keefe was unconstitutionally deprived
expert assistance; (2) whether Keefe was provided a proper
resentencing hearing in accordance with Miller v. Alabama1; (3)
whether the district court incorrectly relied on expert testimony
when fixing Keefe’s sentence; and (4) whether Keefe was denied a
fair and impartial hearing, thereby violating his constitutional right
to due process.2 It is significant because it considers whether
sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without parole, absent a
jury finding irreparable corruption and permanent incorrigibility,
violates the Sixth or Eighth Amendments.3 Because the bulk of the
Court’s analysis will hinge on the first two issues, the remaining two
issues will not be addressed.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 22, 1986, appellant Steven Wayne Keefe was
convicted by a jury for three counts of deliberate homicide and one
count of burglary.4 Keefe was sentenced to three terms of life
imprisonment for each homicide, one ten-year term for the burglary,
*

J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of
Montana Class of 2022.
1
567 U.S. 460 (2012).
2
See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, Keefe v. Kirkegard,
https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/getDocByCTrackId?DocId=290925 (Mont.
Oct. 16, 2019) (No. DA 19-0368); Brief of Appellee at 4, Keefe v. Kirkegard,
https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/getDocByCTrackId?DocId=290925 (Mont.
Apr. 27, 2020) (No. DA 19-0368).
3
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that a finding of irreparable
corruption and permanent incorrigibility is required to enhance a juvenile’s
sentence from life without the possibility of parole to life with the possibility of
parole).
4
State v. Keefe, 759 P.2d 128, 133 (Mont. 1988).
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and four ten-year terms for the use of a weapon, set to run
consecutively.5 The offenses occurred on October 15, 1985, while
Keefe was still a juvenile; he broke into a residence in Great Falls,
Montana, and killed three individuals.6 Keefe had moved to Great
Falls shortly before turning eighteen to seek employment, and had
already committed more than fifty known non-violent crimes.7
Keefe endured a difficult family life prior to moving; his father
abandoned him and his mother at a young age, his mother neglected
him, and he experienced abuse from a school teacher and his
mother’s partners.8 The original sentencing court did not consider
these factors as mitigating when imposing his sentence.9
Keefe appealed his convictions in 1988 asserting evidentiary
error, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed.10 In 2017, Keefe’s
petition seeking a new sentencing hearing was granted, after which
his original sentence was re-imposed following consideration of his
youth as a mitigating factor.11 In December of 2018, following the
Court’s decision in Steilman v. Michael,12 the district court vacated
Keefe’s sentence and ordered a resentencing hearing.13 Prior to the
hearing, the district court appointed a psychiatrist to conduct a
psychological evaluation of Keefe considering the characteristics of
his youth and impact those characteristics may have had on his
criminal activity.14 In April of 2019, Keefe was resentenced to three
consecutive life sentences for each homicide count and five
consecutive ten-year sentences for the burglary count and use of a
firearm.15 Finally, after Keefe’s motion for reconsideration with a
new judge was denied, Keefe gave notice of this appeal on June 27,
2019.16

5

Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 1.
Keefe, 759 P.2d at 129–30; Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 1.
7
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 33; Brief of Appellee, supra note 2,
at 3–4.
8
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 5–6.
9
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 2.
10
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 1.
11
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 2 (consideration of youth as a mitigating
factor was required under Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) and
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)).
12
407 P.3d 313 (Mont. 2017) (holding that a sentencing court must analyze the
Miller factors when sentencing a juvenile defendant to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole in Montana).
13
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 1.
14
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 2; Brief of Appellee, supra note 2,
at 14.
15
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 3.
16
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 3.
6
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

When considering a sentence of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole in Montana, the sentencing court is required
to analyze a number of mitigating factors related to the juvenile’s
youth.17 Upon consideration of these factors, the parties reached
opposing conclusions regarding whether Keefe could
constitutionally be sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole.18 The parties also dispute whether Keefe is constitutionally
entitled to an expert, and whether the district court’s appointed
psychiatrist sufficed.19
A.

Appellant’s Argument

First, Keefe argues he was unconstitutionally deprived
access to expert assistance because the district court’s appointed
psychiatrist did not provide more than an examination of Keefe,
contrary to the requirements of Ake v. Oklahoma.20 Keefe asserts he
was entitled to an expert because his mental condition was a
substantial factor at trial.21 Keefe claims his mental condition was a
substantial factor because (1) the district court made it an issue when
it appointed an expert to evaluate Keefe; (2) Keefe wanted to argue
an absence of a mental defect to prove “transient immaturity”; and
(3) a defendant’s mental status is “inextricably intertwined” with the
issue of irreparable corruption, a requirement for a life sentence
without the possibility of parole for a juvenile.22 Alternatively,
Keefe maintains he should be granted relief to address the
unresolved question of whether the defense is entitled to its own
expert.23
17

Steilman, 407 P.3d at 318–19.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 23; Brief of Appellee, supra note
2, at 32.
19
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 13–22; Brief of Appellee, supra
note 2, at 21–28.
20
470 U.S. 68 (1985) (stating that an indigent defendant is entitled to an expert
to “conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense” if certain requirements are met); Appellant’s
Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 18–22.
21
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 18; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1–
6, Keefe v. Kirkegard,
https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/getDocByCTrackId?DocId=316586 (Mont.
June 5, 2020) (No. DA 19-0368).
18

Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 18; Appellant’s Reply Brief,
supra note 21, at 1–6.
23
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 21, at 4 (the Supreme Court of the United
States declined to answer whether defense counsel is entitled to their own expert
22
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Next, Keefe argues he was deprived of a proper Miller
hearing because the district court declined to give meaningful
consideration to the mitigating factors of Keefe’s youth at the time
of the offense.24 Keefe argues it was error for the district court to
disregard his evidence of post-incarceration conduct because
juveniles have heightened capacity for improvement and integration
back into society, and the evidence overwhelmingly supports
Keefe’s rehabilitative efforts, refuting a finding of irreparable
corruption at the time of the offenses.25 Further, Keefe contends
Miller provides that evidence of childhood trauma and neglect are
relevant to a finding of irreparable corruption, thus it was error for
the district court to overlook Keefe’s childhood trauma and
neglect.26 Due to the error from the insufficient Miller hearing,
Keefe argues his sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole is violative of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
cruel and unusual punishment because it is disproportionate to his
offenses committed as a juvenile.27
Finally, Keefe argues he was entitled to jury resolution
regarding whether Keefe was irreparably corrupt because such a
finding enhances his sentence by making him ineligible for parole.28
Keefe maintains that it violates the Sixth Amendment to sentence
juveniles to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in
Montana absent a jury finding that the juvenile’s offenses reflect
irreparable corruption and permanent incorrigibility rather than
transient immaturity.29 Keefe claims these errors were not harmless,
and as a result, he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing in front of
a new judge.30

as part of the defense team, Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, but Keefe maintains that Ake
alludes to the conclusion that the defense is entitled to their own expert).
24
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 23–27; Appellant’s Reply Brief,
supra note 21, at 7.
25
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 27–33; Appellant’s Reply Brief,
supra note 21, at 11–12 (citing United States v. Briones, 929 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir.
2019) to assert that evidence of rehabilitation is important to determine whether
the defendant was irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible at the time
of the offense).
26
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 36–39.
27
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 41–42.
28
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 40–42 (arguing that Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004);
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); and MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–1–
401 require that any fact used to enhance a sentence must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt).
29
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 41–42.
30
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 54.
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Appellee’s Argument

The State of Montana disputes that Keefe was unconstitutionally
deprived of expert assistance because the district court’s
appointment of a psychiatrist to evaluate him provided him with
access to “one competent psychiatrist.”31 Further, the State asserts
that Keefe was not entitled to an expert because he did not
demonstrate that the presence of a mental disease or defect was at
issue and his case is not a capital case.32 Additionally, the State
argues it was not improper for the court to appoint a psychological
expert because courts in Montana have discretion over the mental
examination of a defendant.33
Next, the State argues the district court properly assessed the
Miller factors when resentencing Keefe because, despite Keefe’s
youth, he was competent and did not act out of juvenile
impulsiveness or reactivity.34 The State supports this assertion by
explaining that Keefe was capable of “extricating” himself from his
dysfunctional family life; he was almost the age of majority at the
time of the offense, and he was sober and acted independently.35 The
State further claims that Keefe’s statements made at his trial as a
juvenile, coupled with his psychological assessments, confirm his
competency and independence.36 The State argues Keefe did not
exhibit potential for rehabilitation at sentencing due to his criminal
history, antisocial personality disorder, and failure in youth
treatment facilities.37 Finally, the State contends that a jury was not
obliged to conclude whether Keefe was irreparably corrupt, and the
judge was correct to do so because the sentencing court is afforded
exclusive authority for imposing criminal sentences.38

31

Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 24–26.
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 24–26.
33
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 27–29 (distinguishing United States v. Pete,
819 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2016) and citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–18–112(4)).
34
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 32.
35
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 32–35.
36
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 32–37 (distinguishing Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012)).
37
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 38, 42–43.
38
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 45 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–1–401).
32
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ANALYSIS
Expert Assistance

To determine whether Keefe was unconstitutionally
deprived expert assistance, the Court will primarily rely on Ake v.
Oklahoma, which entitles an indigent defendant access to a
competent psychiatrist for the purpose of conducting an
“appropriate examination and assist[ing] in evaluation, preparation,
and presentation of the defense” if the defendant demonstrates that
their sanity at the time of the offense will be a “significant factor” at
trial.39 Despite the appellee’s argument that Ake is inapplicable to
Keefe’s case because it is not a capital case, the Court will likely
proceed with an Ake analysis because the holding in Ake has not
been limited to capital cases.40 Rather, this idea was expressed solely
in Justice Burger’s concurrence, which is not binding law.41 As the
parties do not dispute that Keefe is indigent, the Court’s dispositive
determination will be whether Keefe met the threshold requirement
to entitle him to an expert pursuant to Ake by demonstrating to the
district court that his sanity at the time of the offense would be a
significant factor at trial.42
The Court will likely find that Keefe is entitled to an expert,
but not for the same reasons that Keefe argues (that the district court
made his sanity an issue when it appointed a psychiatrist to examine
him). This is because precedent dictates that the defendant must
make the “preliminary showing” that their sanity will be a
substantial factor in order to procure an expert under Ake.43 As in
Ake, where the defendant utilized an insanity defense at trial,
Keefe’s desire to prove absence of insanity or mental disease or
defect to support a finding of “transient immaturity” would
correspondingly make his sanity a substantial factor at the
resentencing hearing.44 Because Ake is applicable at the sentencing
phase, Keefe demonstrated his sanity would be a substantial factor.45
Alternatively, if the Court determines that Keefe is entitled to a jury
39

470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
Id.
41
Id. at 87 (Burger, J., concurring, stating that “[n]othing in the Court’s opinion
reaches non-capital cases.”).
42
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 21–22.
43
See Ake, 470 U.S. at 83 (explaining that defendant must make a “preliminary
showing” that his sanity will be a substantial factor).
44
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 21, at 1–2; Brief of Appellee, supra note
2, at 24.
45
Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that “[t]his
right applies not only at trial, but also in ‘the sentencing phase.’”) (citing Ake, 470
U.S. at 83–84).
40
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determination regarding irreparable corruption and permanent
incorrigibility, then Keefe’s sanity at the time of the offense is likely
a substantial factor at trial because such a finding necessarily
involves considerations of his mental capacity, as a defendant
cannot consistently exhibit capacity for rehabilitation and be
irreparably corrupt.46
Assuming the Court determines Keefe properly
demonstrated his sanity was a substantial factor or is entitled to jury
resolution regarding irreparable corruption, it will next need to
ascertain whether the appointed expert fulfilled the requirements
mandated by Ake. To do so, the Court will look to precedent set forth
in McWilliams v. Dunn47 and Smith v. McCormick.48 In McWilliams,
the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized that an
examination by a psychiatrist, without more, will not suffice and
concluded the defendant was unconstitutionally deprived his right
to an expert due to the lack of availability of an expert to help
evaluate medical records and examinations or formulate a legal
strategy.49 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in McWilliams concluded that the appointed
psychiatrist did not meet Ake’s requirements because the defendant
had no opportunity to meet with the psychiatrist for evaluation or
discussion of possible defenses, the psychiatrist did not help prepare
the defense, and the lack of an additional psychiatrist left the defense
without an opportunity to rebut the damaging report presented by
the court-appointed psychiatrist.50 Although Ake entitles an indigent
defendant access to an expert, Ake and its successive cases declined
to resolve whether that entitles the defense their own, independent
expert.51
Pursuant to Ake, the Court will likely determine the
appointed expert did not suffice because the expert did not provide
more than a psychiatric examination of Keefe for trial and
subsequent sentencing hearings.52 Similar to McWilliams and
McCormick, Keefe and his counsel lacked access to the expert to
evaluate reports regarding Keefe’s mental condition or help prepare
46

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473 (2012).
137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017).
48
914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990).
49
McWilliams, 137 S. Ct. at 1800.
50
McCormick, 914 F.2d at 1158–59.
51
See Ake, 470 U.S. at 83; McWilliams, 137 S. Ct. at 1800; McCormick, 914 F.2d
at 1159 (concluding that given the specific circumstances, the defendant was
entitled to their own expert, not that the defense is always entitled to their own
expert).
52
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 5; Brief of Appellee, supra note 2,
at 14.
47
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his defense. Thus, in accordance with both McWilliams and
McCormick, Keefe was not provided the assistance prescribed by
Ake. In summary, if the Court finds Keefe adequately demonstrated
his sanity at the time of the offense would be a significant factor at
trial or that he is entitled to a jury determination regarding
irreparable corruption, then the Court will also likely conclude
Keefe is constitutionally entitled to an expert and further that the
appointed expert did not meet Ake’s requirements because he did
not provide more than an examination of Keefe.
B.

Resentencing Hearing

To determine whether Keefe was afforded a proper Miller
resentencing hearing, the Court will need to analyze whether the
district court appropriately considered the mitigating factors of
Keefe’s youth. Miller v. Alabama entitles a juvenile defendant to
considerations of the mitigating factors of their youth prior to
imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole.53
These factors include immaturity, failure to appreciate risks and
consequences, family environment, and potential for
rehabilitation.54 Since Miller applies retroactively in cases on
“collateral review,” such as here, where Keefe is seeking postconviction relief,55 if there has been a significant time lapse between
the defendant’s initial crime and the Miller hearing, the analysis will
involve evidence of post-incarceration rehabilitation because the
defendant’s capacity for rehabilitation may preclude imposition of a
life sentence without parole.56 For purposes of resentencing,
whether a defendant has “change[d] in some fundamental way”
since the commission of the offense is “key evidence” when
conducting a Miller analysis to ascertain whether the defendant
exhibits the capacity for change, thereby negating a finding of
irreparable corruption and permanent incorrigibility.57 Thus, to
determine whether Keefe was provided a sufficient Miller hearing,
the Court’s analysis will hinge on whether Keefe was capable of

53

567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012) (concluding that mandatory sentences of life
without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment, and such a sentence
is reserved for rare cases where the juvenile exhibits irreparable corruption and
permanent incorrigibility).
54
Id.
55
Justice Alito defined “collateral review” in Wall v. Kholi as “a judicial
reexamination of a judgment or claim in a proceeding outside of the direct review
process.” 562 U.S. 545, 547 (2011).
56
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016) (stating that “Miller
announced a substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on collateral review.”);
United States v. Briones, 929 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2019).
57
United States v. Pete, 819 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 2016).
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change, and whether he was granted the opportunity to provide
evidence of such change.58
Integrated with the issue of whether Keefe was provided an
adequate Miller hearing is the issue of whether Keefe was entitled
to a jury determination that he was irreparably corrupt and
permanently incorrigible. To resolve this issue, this Court will look
to Apprendi v. New Jersey59 and two subsequent cases, Blakely v.
Washington60 and State v. Garrymore,61 for guidance. Apprendi
entitles a defendant to jury resolution of any fact that increases the
defendant’s penalty beyond the statutory maximum supported by the
jury verdict or admissions by the defendant.62 Applying the law
from Apprendi, the Supreme Court in Blakely concluded that
enhancing the defendant’s sentence based on a judicial finding of
“deliberate cruelty” was improper and the defendant was entitled to
submission to a jury because the enhancement was not supported by
the jury verdict or defendant’s admissions.63 Also applying the law
from Apprendi, the Court in Garrymore emphasized that a
sentencing judge maintains broad discretion when determining
sentence parameters and a defendant is not entitled to jury resolution
of all facts, only those that enhance the sentence to one unsupported
by the jury verdict or defendant’s admissions.64 After Garrymore
was sentenced to life imprisonment and the judge concluded he was
ineligible for parole due to his prior convictions and lack of remorse,
this Court held that his Sixth Amendment rights were not violated
because those particular facts were not relevant to whether the
defendant had a “legal right to a lesser sentence.”65
The Court will likely conclude Keefe is entitled to jury
resolution regarding irreparable corruption and permanent
incorrigibility because such a finding is required to constitutionally
make him parole ineligible, and the jury did not consider this factor
because Miller had not yet been decided nor did Keefe admit such a
58

Briones, 929 F.3d at 1067 (citing Pete, 819 F.3d at 1133).
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
60
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
61
145 P.3d 946 (Mont. 2006).
62
530 U.S. at 490 (concluding that although the purpose to intimidate “sentence
enhancer” was not an explicit element of the crime, it was entitled to submission
to a jury because it increased the defendant’s sentence beyond what was
authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (citing Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)).
63
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (explaining that any specific fact, including an
aggravating fact, that enhances a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory
maximum must be supported by the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant,
otherwise it is entitled to submission to the jury).
64
Garrymore, 145 P.3d at 952.
65
Id. at 953 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 309) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59
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finding. The jury was incapable of considering irreparable
corruption and permanent incorrigibility when Keefe was initially
convicted because Miller was not decided until more than twenty
years later. Additionally, Keefe rebutted a finding that he was
irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible by asserting he had
rehabilitated during his years incarcerated. Similar to Blakely, the
sentencing judge independently determined whether Keefe was
irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible; therefore, unless
the facts from the jury verdict can support this finding, Keefe will
likely be entitled to submission to a jury. Consistent with appellee’s
assertions, it seems at first glance that Keefe is not entitled to jury
resolution, due to the broad discretion a sentencing judge is afforded
at sentencing.66
However, the Court will likely conclude otherwise because
Keefe’s case exhibits several important distinguishing factors from
Garrymore. First, unlike Garrymore, Keefe was a juvenile and
accordingly, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was
not within his maximum possible sentence permitted by statute.67
Therefore, the judge in Garrymore was afforded broader discretion
to make Garrymore parole ineligible because Garrymore was not
entitled to the additional protections that juveniles are provided in
the criminal justice system.68 Second, considerations of prior
criminal history and lack of remorse are distinct from a finding of
irreparable corruption and permanent incorrigibility, which has been
reserved for “rare” juveniles and based on specific considerations of
youth and capacity of rehabilitation.69 Therefore, consistent with
Apprendi, Blakely and their progeny, Keefe is likely entitled to jury
resolution because such a conclusion enhances his sentence beyond
the statutory maximum authorized by Miller and supported by
Keefe’s admissions, unless a review of the facts accepted by the jury
is capable of supporting such a finding.
Consistent with the conclusion that Keefe is likely entitled
to a jury finding regarding irreparable corruption and permanent
incorrigibility, the Court will likely find Keefe was not afforded a
sufficient Miller hearing because the mitigating attributes of his
youth and evidence of rehabilitation were not given proper
consideration. Specifically, the Court will likely conclude that Keefe
is entitled to present evidence of post-incarceration rehabilitation
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 45; Garrymore, 145 P.3d at 953–
55.
67
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–18–222(1).
68
See Garrymore, 145 P.3d at 953–55; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471
(2012).
69
See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 726 (2016); Miller, 567 U.S. at
479–80.
66
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because a significant amount of time has lapsed since the crime and
it refutes the conclusion that he is irreparably corrupt and
permanently incorrigible, thus it is determinative of whether he can
constitutionally be sentenced to life without parole.70 Additionally,
evidence of post-incarceration rehabilitation is specifically relevant
to whether Keefe has a “legal right to a lesser sentence,” pursuant to
Miller.71 This is consistent with the agreed upon view that prospects
of rehabilitation and impact of incarceration are relevant evidence at
a Miller resentencing hearing.72 Further, the Court will likely
conclude it was improper to not consider evidence of Keefe’s
childhood abuse and neglect because Miller and the following cases
affirm that those factors are relevant to whether the defendant’s
actions reflect transient immaturity rather than irreparable
corruption and permanent incorrigibility.73 In conclusion, because
Keefe is entitled to consideration of the unique characteristics of his
youth at the time of the offenses, the Court will likely find Keefe is
entitled to jury resolution regarding irreparable corruption and
entitled to present evidence of rehabilitation and childhood abuse
and neglect.74
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court will likely conclude that (1) Keefe is entitled to
expert assistance and the appointed psychiatrist did not suffice, and
(2) Keefe was not afforded a proper Miller hearing and should be
allowed to present evidence of post-incarceration rehabilitation.
Further, Keefe v. Kirkegard offers the Montana Supreme Court an
opportunity to address several unresolved constitutional issues
pertaining to juveniles in the criminal justice system. Is a juvenile
defendant entitled to jury resolution that they are irreparably
corrupt? Does a judicial finding of irreparable corruption violate
their constitutional rights under the Sixth or Eighth Amendments?
Resolving these questions provides the Court a chance to contribute
to the ongoing discussion regarding the constitutional ramifications

70

See Miller, 567 U.S. at 478; United States v. Briones, 929 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th
Cir. 2019).
71
Miller, 567 U.S. at 479; Briones, 929 F.3d at 1067; Pete, 819 F.3d at 1133.
72
See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (“A State is not required to guarantee eventual
freedom, but must provide some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based
on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 74 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Briones, 929 F.3d at 1067;
Pete, 819 F.3d at 1133.
73
Miller, 567 U.S. at 476 (explaining that the Court had previously found
“evidence [of abuse and neglect] ‘particularly relevant’ – more so than it would
have been in the case of an adult offender.”) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
74
Id. at 472–75.
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of sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment, and further imposing
parole ineligibility.

